摘要
基于我国灾害救助以政府为主、商业性模式开发不足,且海洋灾害风险管理实践发展相对落后的现实,以PPP模式为雏形的灾害保险不失为一种有益的尝试。针对海洋灾害保险存在的信息不对称与主体地位不对等问题,在引入再保险机构、构建新的不对称PPP参与模式基础上,运用灰博弈模型对各主体参与的动态博弈过程及稳定策略进行分析,利用原保险与再保险双维灰博弈矩阵,求得各参数情形下的稳定策略,并对各情形下的稳定策略实现路径进行具体解析,为海洋灾害保险合作模式的达成提供进一步的决策参考。
In the light of the reality that disaster relief in China is government-based,the development of commercial models is insufficient,and the development of marine disaster risk management is relatively backward,the disaster insurance based on the PPP model can be accepted as a beneficial attempt.To deal with the problem of information asymmetry and subject status′inequality of marine disaster insurance,on the basis of introducing reinsurance institutions and constructing a new asymmetric PPP model,the gray game model is used to analyze the dynamic game process and stability strategy of each subject.By using the two-dimensional gray game matrix of the original insurance and reinsurance,the stability strategy under various parameters is obtained,and the realization path of the stability strategy under each situation is analyzed in detail,which provides further decision-making reference for the achievement of the marine disaster insurance cooperation mode.
作者
郑慧
赵昕
周璐
ZHENG Hui;ZHAO Xin;ZHOU Lu(School of Economics,Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China;Instetrte of Marine Development of Ocean University of China,Qingdao 266100,China;National Marine Data and Information Service,Tianjin 300171,China)
出处
《海洋经济》
2020年第1期3-12,共10页
Marine Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目[71503238]
中国博士后科学基金项目[2017M621044]
山东社科新型智库研究专项[19CZKJ25].
关键词
海洋灾害保险
灰色博弈理论
主体决策
Marine disaster insurance
Theory of grey game
Subject decision-making
