摘要
以2007-2018年中国上市公司发行的上市公司债为研究样本,本文考察了机构投资者持股对债券限制性条款设计的影响。研究发现:(1)机构投资者持股可以显著减少债券限制性条款的使用,机构投资者持股比例越高,债券限制性条款的使用越少;(2)机构投资者通过改善公司治理和信息环境,缓解了债券发行人与债券投资者之间的代理冲突,从而减少了债券限制性条款的使用;(3)当机构投资者非独立、持股稳定性较强、机构数量较少以及债券发行人为国有企业时,机构投资者对债券限制性条款的抑制作用更强。本文发现了机构投资者对债券市场的积极稳定作用,为债券限制性条款设计提供了理论依据,同时也肯定了中国背景下推动机构投资者发展的积极意义。
Taking listed corporate bonds issued by Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as a research sample,this paper examines the influence of institutional investors’shareholding on the design of restrictive bond covenants.The results show that:(1)Institutional investors’shareholding can significantly reduce the use of restrictive bond covenants.The higher the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is,the less restrictive bond covenants are used;(2)Institutional investors eased the agency conflict between bond issuers and bond investors by improving corporate governance and information environment,and reduced the use of restrictive bond covenants;(3)When institutional investors are dependent,more stable in holdings,fewer,and bond issuers are state-owned companies,institutional investors have a stronger inhibitory effect on restrictive bond covenants.This paper discovers the positive stabilizing effect of institutional investors on the bond market,provides a theoretical basis for the design of restrictive bond covenants,and affirms the positive significance of promoting the development of institutional investors in China.
作者
王彤彤
史永东
Wang Tongtong;Shi Yongdong
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第8期124-136,共13页
Accounting Research
基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA094)
国家自然科学基金项目(71971046,72172029)
辽宁特聘教授滚动支持计划(辽教函\[2018\]35号)
辽宁省教育厅项目(LN2019Z11)资助
关键词
机构投资者持股
公司债券限制性条款设计
公司治理
信息披露
Institutional Investor Shares
Restrictive Bond Covenants Design
Corporate Governance
Information Disclosure
