摘要
本文以我国沪深A股上市公司2009-2016年非同一控制下企业合并的并购标的为研究对象,考察了高管权力、权力约束对并购商誉减值合理性和客观性的影响。实证研究结果表明:(1)商誉减值测试时高管权力越小,应予减值的并购商誉实施减值的可能性和比例越高。(2)权力约束对继任高管实施的并购商誉减值大清洗行为产生抑制作用。当继任高管在权力较量中处于弱势时,继任高管对并购商誉减值大清洗动机的减弱程度更加明显。(3)由并购高管权力所派生的并购商誉质量对继任高管上任第一年实施的并购商誉减值大清洗行为产生抑制作用。本文揭示了高管权力受到约束以及前任安排对商誉减值选择行为的影响,为商誉减值的监管提供实证证据。
Using the sample of the targets in business combination under different control acquired by A-share public firms from the year 2009 to 2016,this paper studies the effects of managerial power and power constraint on the impairment of goodwill from M&A activities.The empirical results show that the smaller the managerial power in goodwill impairment testing procedures is,the relatively higher probability and proportion of expected goodwill impairment.The smaller the managerial power is,the relatively lower probability and proportion of goodwill impairment in the year of general manager turnover specially.In addition,that the former managers making M&A activities stay on the board has an effective deterrent effect of lower probability and proportion of goodwill impairment.Further studies show that the greater the managerial power in M&A activities is,the relatively lower probability and proportion of goodwill impairment,no matter whether the managers making M&A activities have been replaced.This paper not only reveal rent-seeking with power in the choice of goodwill impairment behavior,but also provides an empirical evidence for the supervision of goodwill impairment.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第7期49-63,共15页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71972189、71572206、71902038)
广东省人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(2012JDXM-0002)的资助
关键词
高管权力
权力收益
权力约束
并购商誉减值
前任安排
Managerial Power
Power Gains
Power Constraint
Impairment of Goodwill from M&A Activities
Former Managers Arrangement
