摘要
信息不对称是证券交易中普通存在的一个现象,这也导致证券行业的尽调和监管需要付出高额的信息获取和处理成本。基于微观经济理论和信息经济学,本文针对证券市场监管中信息不对称带来的摩擦进行分析,分别构建了传统市场下与监管科技驱动下企业、证券公司和监管机构的三方博弈模型,并利用Matlab进行仿真模拟,在动态演化中分析成本因素对监管博弈系统的影响。研究发现:区块链等监管科技驱动通过减少信息不对称降低了尽调成本和严格监管成本,使得市场监管博弈系统达到帕累托最优状态的条件有所放宽,在特定条件下可促使系统的演化稳定策略从(隐藏,合谋,宽松监管)转为(不隐藏,尽调,严格监管),市场监管从而得到帕累托改进。但尽调成本和监管成本的降低额都存在一个阈值,当超过阈值时,会促使系统收敛到帕累托最优状态;当未超过阈值时,系统不稳定或收敛到帕累托最劣。因此,建议利用区块链赋能监管科技,创新监管方式,着力降低尽调成本和严格监管成本,提高监管效率,以维护证券市场的繁荣稳定。
Information asymmetry is a common phenomenon in securities transactions,which also leads to high information acquisition and processing costs for due diligence and supervision in the securities industry.Based on microeconomic theory and information economics,this paper analyzes the friction caused by information asymmetry in securities market supervision,and constructs a three-party game model of enterprises,securities companies and regulatory agencies under the traditional market and driven by regulatory technology.We use Matlab to simulate and analyze the impact of cost factors on the regulatory game system in dynamic evolution.The study found that regulatory technology drivers such as blockchain reduce the cost of due diligence and the cost of strict supervision by reducing information asymmetry,so that the conditions for the market supervision game system to reach the Pareto optimal state have been relaxed,and under certain conditions,the system can be promoted.The evolutionary stabilization strategy is changed from(hiding,collusion,strict supervision)to(no hiding,due diligence,lax supervision),making market supervision Pareto improvement.However,there is a threshold for the reduction of due diligence cost and supervision cost.When the threshold is exceeded,the system will be forced to converge to the Pareto optimal state;when the threshold is not exceeded,the system is unstable or converges to the Pareto worst.Therefore,we propose to use blockchain to empower regulatory technology,innovate regulatory methods,focus on reducing due diligence costs and strict regulatory costs,and improve regulatory efficiency to maintain the prosperity and stability of the securities market.
出处
《金融监管研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第10期95-114,共20页
Financial Regulation Research
基金
广西哲学社会科学规划研究课题重点项目“重大公共卫生事件冲击下的广西地方金融风险防范化解研究”(项目编号:20AJY001)
广西科技发展战略研究专项课题“基于数字技术的供应链金融科技创新研究”(项目编号:2020ZL00045)阶段性研究成果
关键词
区块链
证券市场监管
信息不对称
演化博弈
帕累托改进
Blockchain
Securities Market Regulation
Information Asymmetry
Evolutionary Game
Pareto Improvement
