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论股东会中心主义治理模式的勃兴:评《公司法(修订草案)》中股东会的权力机构地位 被引量:10

On the Prosperity of the Shareholder-Centric Corporate Governance Model:Comments on the Supreme Authority of the Shareholders’Meeting in the“Company Law(Revised Draft)”
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摘要 股东中心主义价值观是公司法的核心原则,是公司治理体系设计的逻辑起点。股东会中心主义治理模式具有正当性与可行性。新《公司法》应继续确认并夯实股东会的最高权威与终极控制权,扩充股东会法定职权,激活股东会运行机制。《外商投资法》废止了外企三法确立的董事会中心主义模式,实现了内外资公司股东会中心主义的统一并轨。公司合规治理的关键是降低代理成本,而董事会中心主义、总经理中心主义与团队生产理论有悖代理法逻辑。美国上市公司治理历经银行债权人中心主义、经理人中心主义的失败教训,最终回归股东中心主义模式绝非偶然。股权与控制权脱节的“两权分离”是公司治理顽症,而非公司善治的灵丹妙药。董事会是执行机构,而非权力机构。章程与股东会决议有权收回或限制董事会职权。股东会法定职权条款为效力性规范。股东会中心主义模式的普通版、增强版与简易版各有千秋。股东会决议对不妥董事会决策具有例外纠偏与补救功能。 Shareholder-centered values are the core principles of the company law and the logical starting point of the institutional arrangements of corporate governance.The governance model of shareholders’meeting centralism has legitimacy and feasibility.The new Company Law should continue to confirm and consolidate the supreme authority and ultimate control power of the shareholders’meeting,expand its statutory powers,and activate its operation mechanism.The Foreign Investment Law abolishes the model of board of directors centralism established by the three laws of foreign enterprises,and realizes the unification of shareholders’meeting central⁃ism of domestic and foreign companies.The key to corporate compliance governance is to reduce agency costs,while board centralism,general manager centralism and team production theory are contrary to the logic of agency law.It is no coincidence that the corporate governance of listed companies in the U.S.experienced the failures of bank creditor-centrism and manager-cen⁃trism,and finally has returned to the shareholder centralism model.The separation of ownership and control is a persistent problem of corporate governance,not a panacea for good corporate gov⁃ernance.The board of directors is an executive body,not an authority.The Articles of Associa⁃tion and the resolution of the shareholders’meeting shall have the right to withdraw or restrict the powers of the board of directors.The statutory authority clauses of the shareholders’meeting are effective norms.The ordinary version,the enhanced version and the simplified version of the shareholders’meeting centralism model have their own merits.The resolution of the board of shareholders has the functions of exceptional correction and remedy for the improper decision-making of the board of directors.
作者 刘俊海 Liu Junhai
出处 《法学杂志》 CSSCI 北大核心 2023年第5期14-36,共23页 Law Science Magazine
关键词 股东中心主义 剩余索取权 最终控制权 权力机构 董事会 shareholder centralism residual claim ultimate control supreme authority board of directors
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