摘要
家庭医生是基层医疗服务机构的核心力量,如何强化家庭医生的人才建设,提高家庭医生的服务水平是完善家庭医生签约服务的关键问题。为了探索核心医院帮扶作用及政府监管机制对家庭医生质量水平的影响,本文在考虑家庭医生技术水平、家庭医生错诊率及政府奖惩制度的基础上,建立了家庭医生与核心医院行为策略选择演化博弈模型,并获得了不同收益情形下博弈双方的最优策略选择。结果表明:缩小高低水平家庭医生间的错诊率差值,提高家庭医生技术水平,加强核心医院帮扶家庭医生力度及政府奖惩力度均会使得博弈双方选择策略向“家庭医生积极配合核心医院,核心医院积极帮扶家庭医生”的方向演变。
Family doctors are the essential parts of the community healthcare services.How to strengthen the family doctors′professional skills and improve their service quality are the key issues in promoting the contracted family doctor services.To find out the effect of core hospitals in helping family doctors and government supervision on the family doctors′performance,this paper proposed an evolutionary game model of behavior strategy choice between family doctors and core hospitals.The model considered the level of expertise and misdiagnosis rate of family doctors,as well as the government′s reward-and-punishment mechanism.It obtained the optimal behavioral strategies between family doctors and core hospitals under different situations.The results show that narrowing the difference of misdiagnosis rate between high-level and low-level family doctors,improving the family doctors′level of expertise,strengthening the efforts of core hospitals helping family doctors,and governments′rewards and punishments make the result evolving to the way that family doctors actively cooperate with core hospitals and core hospitals actively help family doctors.
作者
罗利
李玥
单仁邦
张思琪
房圆晨
LUO Li;LI Yue;SHAN Renbang;ZHANG Siqi;FANG Yuanchen(Business School,Sichuan University,Chengdu,Sichuan 610065,China)
出处
《工业工程与管理》
北大核心
2022年第1期46-55,共10页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71532007,71131006)
关键词
家庭医生
核心医院
策略选择
错诊率
奖惩机制
演化博弈
family doctors
core hospitals
strategy selection
misdiagnosis rate
reward and punishment mechanism
evolutionary game
