摘要
在贯彻中央政策的过程中,地方政府执行政策的态度以及中央、地方两级政府策略互动的结果,在很大程度上决定着政策执行的效果。本文从博弈理论的视角出发,通过分析地方政府主观偏差行为的表现形式及两级政府策略互动的博弈机理,探讨实现有效博弈均衡的参数条件,并就提高地方政府政策执行绩效提出制度创新建议。
It determinated the effects of policies implementation for the local governments attitudes toward the carrying–out of the central policies and the central and local governments interaction during the act of the central ones. This paper analyzes the performance forms of local governments subjective deviation behavior and the game machanism from the angle of view of the game-theory,and it surveys the realizing for the parameter conditions of the effective game balance and raises some systematic innovation su...
出处
《社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第8期73-79,共7页
Journal of Social Sciences
关键词
公共政策
政策执行
主观偏差行为
博弈
制度创新
Public Policies
Policies Implementation
Subjective Deviation Behavior
Game
Systematic Innovation
