摘要
本文构建了一个基于多维私人信息、多维投标的拍卖模型,旨在解释常见的投标拍卖中非约束定价现象。在模型中,投标人有着二维私人信息:成本和生产率,同时他们被要求递交一个二维的竞标:设计竞标和价格竞标。拍卖人使用一个评分函数来评价竞标人递交的竞标。支付在拍卖之后的讨价还价中决定,因此拍卖阶段的价格竞标最后没有被实现,是无约束力的。本文论证了即使在价格竞标无约束力的情况下,也存在着均衡状况下的设计竞标、价格竞标和评分函数。进一步,模型给出了两个可验证的假设:(1)最优的设计竞标随着生产率的上升而上升,而成本对于设计竞标有两个相斥的影响;(2)好的设计总是会使竞标人更有可能赢得合同,然而低廉的价格未必如是。最后,我们阐述了本文的模型和标准的最优拍卖模型的联系与差别,并对两个模型进行了比较。
The paper set up an auction model based on multi-dimensional private information and bidding to explain the non-binding pricing which is common in bidding auction. In the model, the bid of price and design are submitted by the bidders who have two-dimensional private information which is cost and productivity. The auctioneer evaluates the bid using a scoring function. Payment is determined in a bargaining stage after the auction, so that price bidding is not executed, and thus non-binding. The results show that there is design bidding, price bidding and scoring function under balanced state even in non-binding bid. Furthermore, the model provides two verifiable assumptions. One is the most optimal design bidding is rising along with the rising of productivity while cost has two opposite effects on design bidding. The other is that better design can always have more chances for bidders to obtain contracts while cheap price is not the case. Finally, the paper illustrated the relationship and differences between this model and the most optimal auction design, and compared the two models in different dimensions.
出处
《浙江社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2013年第2期40-49,157,共11页
Zhejiang Social Sciences
关键词
无约束力竞价
采购拍卖
评分拍卖
non-binding bid
procurement auction
scoring auction
