摘要
2012年,中国证监会鼓励上市公司大股东增持公司股票的事件受到了资本市场的广泛关注。文章通过对不同产权性质企业的大股东增持行为进行理论分析和实证检验发现:从动机看,非国有大股东的增持决策与公司前期股价的低估程度显著相关,而国有大股东的增持决策与公司前期股价表现之间的关系则较弱;从后果看,国有大股东增持后一年内股票超额报酬率的改善程度比非国有大股东增持后显著要低。这些结果表明,非国有大股东的增持是基于经济利益最大化的市场化行为,而国有大股东的增持则可能是配合政府政策的短期行为。进一步的研究还发现,国有大股东的这种非市场化增持行为在中央控制的国有企业中尤为明显。
The event that China Securities Regulatory Commission encouraged large shareholders of listed companies to increase the shareholdings in 2012 attracted extensive attention from capital market.This paper theoretically analyzes and empirically tests large shareholders' increase in shareholdings in firms with different property rights.It comes to the conclusions that,as for motives,the increasing-shareholding decision-making of non-state-owned large shareholders is significantly correlated with the underestimation of prophase stock prices,while the increasing-shareholding decision-making of state-owned large shareholders has weak effect on the performance of prophase stock prices;as for consequences,the improvement of accumulated abnormal stock return rates of state-owned large shareholders in the next year after the shareholding increase is obviously lower than non-state-owned large shareholders.It shows that the shareholding increase of non-state-owned shareholders is market-oriented behavior based on the maximization of economic interests and the shareholding increase of state-owned shareholders perhaps is short-term behavior matching government policy.Further study also indicates that the non-market-oriented shareholding increase of state-owned large shareholders is especially obvious in state-owned enterprises controlled by the central government.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2014年第12期4-14,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71372042
71172141
71372041)
教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(12JJD790033)
关键词
大股东增持
国有大股东
非国有大股东
股票累积超额收益
large shareholders' increase in shareholdings
state-owned large share-holder
non-state-owned large shareholder
accumulated abnormal stock return
