摘要
各城市争相构建金融中心,是因为其中不乏预期收益。但各种博弈模型显示,金融中心构建之争又必然带来最大化收益之不能实现难题。地方政府间各自追逐利益的行为将有悖于帕累托最优的实现,最终将造成整个国家利益的流失。因此,为了解决金融中心构建的博弈难题,需要设立某种机制使局中人的个人利益与整个社会利益相联系,使他们在做出个人理性的决策时也能体现集体理性。
All cities are competing to establish financial centers, because they may get the anticipated profits. However, all game models show that the competition in the establishment of financial centers will inevitably bring about the impossibility of profit maximum. The actions that local governments take to pursue profit will hinder the realization of Pareto optimum, which will finally lead to the loss of interests of the whole nation. Thus, in order to cope with the dilemma of games in the establishment of financial centers, it is necessary to set up some mechanism so that the interests of the players are related to those of the whole society and their personally rational decisions will also reflect collective rationalism.
出处
《华南金融研究》
2004年第3期8-13,共6页
South China Financial Research
