摘要
为了探索创新联盟稳定形成机理 ,解决创新伙伴关系的早夭问题 ,假设参与者通过认可的谈判规则形成创新联盟 ,在分析由企业和研究机构所形成联盟的动态特征和外部特征的基础上 ,提出创新联盟的一对一动态匹配模型。给出了稳定动态联盟结构存在的条件 ,并基于经典匹配理论提出了动态延迟接受算法。研究结果表明 :如果偏好序严格、贴现因子不大于全局临界贴现因子 ,则存在由企业 (或研究机构 )提议的全局最优稳定创新联盟结构。
To explore the formation mechanism of innovative coalition stability and prevent abortion of innovative partners, the one-to-one dynamic matching model of innovative coalitions was presented based on the analysis of dynamic and external characteristics of firm-research institute innovation coalitions with the assumption that innovative coalitions were formed through admissive negotiation rules. The existing conditions of stable dynamic coalition were given, and the dynamic deferred acceptance algorithm was developed based on the classical two-sided matching theory. It indicated that the globally optimal and stable innovation coalition structures were existed in case that preference orders were strict and the discount factors were less than the overall critical discount factor. These conclusions provided technical foundation for innovation partners to form stable innovation coalition structures.
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第10期1296-1300,共5页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 70 3 72 0 5 0
70 1710 0 7)
青岛大学科研基金资助项目~~
关键词
联盟结构
企业
创新
贴现因子
动态联盟
偏好
谈判
全局最优
算法
延迟
innovation coalition
formation mechanism
coalition structure
dynamic deferred acceptance algorithm
two-sided matching
