摘要
假定市场是完全竞争的,以卖者退货返款期T为决策变量,基于委托代理理论建立一次性交易中揭示产品质量信息的模型,给出了一个可避免逆向选择的机制.指出现实中企业以接受该机制作为信号传递来揭示所提供的产品是高质量产品;生产低质量产品的企业不可能效仿,因为那样做无利可图.该模型还说明在非对称信息下企业会将高质量产品价格定得较对称信息下高些,但交易双方在两种情况下所得的期望效用不会改变.
A model to reveal the information of the products quality is presented based on the principal-agent theory, supposing one time market trade with complete competition. The model provides a mechanism to avoid the adverse selection. Enterprises will accept the mechanism to transfer signals to reveal the high quality of their products. And those with low-quality products fail to follow it because in that way they will gain no profit at all. Enterprises will order the higher price in the asymmetric information rather than in the symmetry information, but both sides of trade will not change the expectation utility in two circs.
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2005年第1期62-64,72,共4页
Control and Decision
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70372011).
关键词
信用
逆向选择
期望效用
委托代理
机制设计
Accreditation
Industrial economics
Information management
Quality control
