摘要
本文以1999～2002年发生于沪、深 A 股市场的56起并购事件为样本,采用事件研究法对管理者代理动机与并购绩效之间的关系做了一些实证检验。实证结论表明,并购给收购公司股东带来显著的财富损失,而对目标公司股东的财富影响不显著;并购前管理者能力好的收购公司或现金流量充足的收购公司,其并购绩效更差,研究结果支持自大假说和自由现金流量假说;也为收购高成长的目标公司使得收购公司股东受损的假设提供了弱的证据;但实证研究没有发现多元化导致较差的并购绩效的证据。
This paper studies 56 M&A events happened between listed companies in China during 1999 to 2002.Event study has been used to verify the negative relationship between managerial motive and the acquiring firms'performance.Empirical results show that shareholders'wealth of the acquiring firms suffer significant loss during the M&A events.While M&A events have no significant effect on the target firms'shareholder wealth.Acquiring firms have predominantly bad announcement period perfor- mance when its managers performed poorly before the acquisition,and when their have enough cash flows before the acquisition. Studies also find weak support for the negative announcement period performance for the acquiring when buying a rapidly growing target.But we do not find any evidence supporting the negative announcement effect when the acquiring firms take diversified acquisitions.
出处
《经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第4期4-12,共9页
Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
