风险投资中的可转换证券与双重道德风险研究被引量：25

Double Moral Hazard Problem and Convertible Securities in Venture Capital

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摘要目前有关风险投资中的道德风险研究主要针对风险企业家的道德风险问题,并提出解决方法,却忽视了投资方的道德风险问题。因而有必要从双重道德风险的角度来分析风险投资中双方的投入问题,才能更有效解决投资方与风险企业家在投入上的机制问题,推动风险企业家和投资方尽最大努力去经营风险企业。通过研究发现在双重道德风险情况下双方的投入会有明显的不足,然而通过可转换证券有助于解决这一问题。 Current studies on moral hazard of venture capital mainly focus on the moral hazard of the entrepreneur, but ignores that of the investor's. Therefore, this paper intends to analyze the input from both sides in venture capital in terms of double moral hazard. We expect find an effective input mechanism for the investor and the entrepreneur, so as to motivate the entrepreneur and investor in operating the venture. The study finds that there are obvious deficiencies in input from both sides in case of double moral hazard, but it can he solved by means of convertible securities.

作者张卫国罗军吴丙山

机构地区重庆大学经济与工商管理学院

出处《管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第2期27-32,共6页 Journal of Management Science

关键词风险投资双重道德风险可转换证券 Venture capital Double moral hazard Convertible securities

分类号 F27 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献14

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