摘要
结合新制度经济学的有关理论,对我国历史上的均田制进行分析是很有意义的。作为国家强制性的制度变迁形式,均田制依靠国家的力量得以推行,为国家建立税收基础,以实现国家租金收入的最大化。但是,在均田制实施的过程中,却遭遇到了来自下层的变通与退出力量,使得均田制度的演进过程又呈现出既定利益结构下的诱致性变迁。
Based on the theory of New Institutional Economics, this paper analyzes the Equally Dividing Field System in Chinese history. It argues that Equally Dividing Field System is a compulsive institutional change of the country, so it needs the state power to enforce it, in order to construct the tax base of the country and to make the country get as much revenue as possible. But in the process of carrying out the system, there were the powers of alternative and exit that came from the low stratum, and these powers changed the Equally Dividing Field System in different directions.
出处
《史学月刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第8期25-30,共6页
Journal of Historical Science
关键词
制度变迁
均田制
变通
退出
institutional change
Equally Dividing Field System
alternative
exit
