摘要
在利率管制下的卖方垄断型信贷市场中,担保额是银行甄别企业风险的有效工具,但这依赖于企业的风险收益特征。第三方担保可以帮助禀赋不足的企业融资。由于不同担保机构对企业信息了解程度不同,文章通过模型证明,在对会内企业担保时,互助担保比政府担保具有优势。互助担保不会引起利益的重新分配。因为存在市场分割,政府担保是不可或缺的。政府担保会引起风险转嫁,导致收益在企业内部、银行与企业之间重新分配。
In the monopolistic credit market with regulation interest rate, collateral is an efficient tool to screen the risk of SMEs. The third-part collateral increases the indirect financing ability of SMEs. Based on the theory of information economics, we use mathematical model to compare the behaviors of different guarantee institutions and discuss the way they affect the choices of banks and SMEs. The results prove that mutual guarantee institutions are preponderant to government guarantee institutions. Mutual guarantee don＇t change the profits of SMEs and banks. At the same time, government guarantee is absolutely necessary because of market characteristic but it redistributes profits among SMEs and between bank and SMEs.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第9期58-65,共8页
Economic Research Journal
