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审计委员会:本原性质与作用机理 被引量:60

Audit Committee:Normative Nature and Functioning Mechanism
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摘要 本文研究审计委员会的本原性质和其在公司治理中的作用机理,并剖析以美国为代表的现行审计委员会制度安排。本文分析指出,审计委员会的本原性质在于,它是代表股东利益直接负责企业外部会计事务,并享有企业内部会计事务的消极权力,从而确保注册会计师对经理人的独立性,以降低企业治理成本。审计委员会的作用机理则需基础于其本原性质而设计。而以美国为代表的现行制度安排下的审计委员会不是符合本原性质的审计委员会,其性质是经理人为履行自身向股东等诚实报告之受托责任而专设的职能管理机构。 The paper discusses what is the normative nature and functioning mechanism of audit committee,and analyzes the existing audit committee institution of U.S.A.According to our analyses,the normative nature of audit committee is that it is one corporate governance committee whose function is to oversee the independent auditing related affairs of company on behalf of shareholders and to share some negative power concerning internal accounting affairs,its members should have accounting,finance and auditing related knowledge,and should be independent from executives (i.e.directors and the board of directors) and be nominated and motivated directly by shareholders.The functioning mechanism design of audit committee should be based on its normative nature.But according to the existing audit committee institution of U.S.A,existing corporate audit committee is not of the above normative nature,its current nature is one of the business administration departments controlled by executives to enforce their accountability regarding true reporting to shareholders.
作者 谢德仁
出处 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第9期69-74,共6页 Accounting Research
基金 教育部"高等学校全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金"的资助项目(项目编号为200160)的研究成果。
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参考文献13

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二级参考文献29

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