摘要
我国地方政府债务扩张,一方面是由于上下级政府财权与事权划分不利于下级地方政府;另一方面是由于各级地方政府本身有扩张财政支出的冲动。但是背后的关键原因在于:在地方政府与上级政府及本地公众的双重委托代理关系中,作为最终委托人的地方公众没有得到选择代理人和代理合约的权利,正是这种对标准委托代理关系的偏离导致了作为代理人的地方政府按其自身利益最大化行事的条件下不能实现公众利益最大化,进而导致地方债务的扩张。
The reason of the debt expansion of local government in China is that on one hand, the division of the ownership of property and duties between the local government of the superior and the subordinate is unfavorable to the subordinate local government; on the other hand, the local government itself at all levels has an impulse of expanding financial expenditure. But the key reason lies in that the local publics functioning as the final principal haven＇t got the rights to choose the principal and principal contract in the double principal-agent relations between the government of the higher lever and the lower level, and between the local government and the local publics. For this reason, the local government acting as a principal doesn＇t maximize the public interests under the condition of taking actions, its own interests.
基金
浙江省教育厅课题(20051550)
关键词
地方政府债务
政府支出
扩张机制
委托代理
debt of local government
financial expenditure
mechanism of expanding
prlncipal-agent
