摘要
按照企业契约是否被终止,本文将国企企业契约分为短期契约(提前终止)和长期契约(未提前终止)两种。通过建立博弈模型,阐述不同契约形式下,股东和经理的策略变化,分析影响双方策略的因素并揭示出形成这一结果的原因,最后提出解决国有企业委托代理问题的对策建议。
According to whether the en（erprise contract is terminated, this paper divides enterprise contract in SOEs into short- term contract （premature termination ） and long-term contract （mature termination） Through setting up game models, it explains the strategy changes of shareholders and managers in different contracts, analyses influential factors and reveals reasons formed this results, and finally puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions sloving them.
出处
《特区经济》
北大核心
2006年第7期176-178,共3页
Special Zone Economy
基金
安徽大学人才队伍建设经费资助
关键词
委托代理
企业契约
博弈分析
激励约束机制
国有企业
Principal - agency
Enterprise contract
Game analysis
Motivating and restraining mechanism
