摘要
根据演化博弈理论建立了重庆市农村劳动力转移的一般化模仿者动态模型(GRD),对重庆市农村劳动力转移最终稳定状态和长期趋势进行了预测分析.研究表明:基期数据中重庆市城乡收入差距越大,最终稳定状态下城镇部门就业比例越大,农村部门就业比例越小;农村劳动力转移的动态过程渐进稳定收敛到均衡点;转移过程的长期趋势与学习障碍无关.
This paper uses the evolutionary game theory to build the generalized replicator dynamic forecasting model, that includes three departments. It forecasts the finally stable state and long-run tendency of Chongqing rural labor transfer. It draws conclusions that the more urban-rural income disparity in basal period statistical data, the less urban department employing proportion and the more rural department employing proportion in the finally stable state. The dynamic function asymptotic stable converges to the Nash equilibrium. The long-run trend for rural labor transfer is independent of learning barriers.
出处
《西南师范大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2006年第4期49-53,共5页
Journal of Southwest China Normal University(Natural Science Edition)
