摘要
保险中介市场是典型的信息不对称市场。当参与人之间存在信息不对称时,市场价格机制往往失灵。此时,像保险人对保险中介人进行激励这种非价格制度安排,对保险中介市场达到均衡则更为有效。对这类问题的研究,目前主要包括显性激励和隐性激励,单因素激励和多因素激励几种方式。本文将运用委托-代理理论,就非对称信息条件下的多因素最优激励合同进行探讨,从而得到保险中介市场达到竞争均衡的条件及市场主体的均衡策略。
The insurance intermediary market is a typical market with asymmetrical information, in this case price mechanism may fail. The non-price institutional arrangements such as incentive contracts provide a more effective style to the equilibrium of a competitive insurance intermediary market. At present, the studies of how insurer exerts incentive to insurance agent mainly includes the analysis of explicit and implicit Incentives, single factor and multi-factor incentives mechanism. In view of the credit standing as an important lucrative factor to insurance agent, it is evident that the analysis of multi-factor incentive mechanism has much academic and realistic significance. Based on the principol-agent theory we discuss the double factors incentive mechanism under asymmetric information, we can get the condition forming equilibrium of a competed insurance intermediary market and the equilibrium strategies of partner.
出处
《中山大学研究生学刊（社会科学版）》
2006年第4期95-103,共9页
Journal of the Graduates Sun YAT-SEN University(Social Sciences)
关键词
非对称信息
保险中介人
均衡分析
多因素激励机制
asymmetric information
insurance intermediary market
equilibrium analysis
multi-factors incentive mechanism
