摘要
在逆向选择经典模型及其改进模型、尤其是在具有私人信息委托人模型的基础上,提出并建立了一种具有现实背景的双方同时面临不确定性的逆向选择模型.通过对模型的求解与分析,将得出的基于双方不确定性的逆向选择的最优契约与完全信息和对称信息下的最优契约进行比较,发现不确定性与信息的不对称性都带来效率或产出水平的扭曲,并且这种扭曲混合在一起,或者相互加剧,或者相互抵消.
Based on the classical adverse selection model and the improved model, especially on the model of principal with private information, a kind of adverse selection model under two-sided uncertainty is proposed and constructed. By analyzing the model and comparing its optimal contract with that which is of complete information and symmetric information under uncertainty, it is concluded that uncertainty and asymmetric information may both make efficiency or output level be distorted and the two kinds of distortions may mix together and influence each other.
出处
《上海理工大学学报》
EI
CAS
北大核心
2006年第6期605-608,共4页
Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology
关键词
不确定性
不对称信息
逆向选择
契约
uncertainty
asymmetric information
adverse selection
contract
