摘要
在单次市场交易中,买者为了甄别产品质量,提出产品试用期T,交易双方构成双重委托代理关系,此时试用期T必须分别满足买卖双方各自的参与约束和激励相容约束,使买卖双方都有积极性参与交易,并且都没有积极性欺骗对方。对上述试用期T最小化便得到一个产品质量甄别契约,该契约可保证非对称信息下买卖双方交易的总期望剩余较对称信息情况不变,并且它全部被买者获得,卖者期望利润为零。
The buyers may put forwards time （T） for product probation to screen product quality just in one trade. Both sides of trade makes double principal-agent relationship, and time （T） for product probation must meets participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint for buyer and seller respectively to make them have enthusiasm to participate in and have no enthusiasm to cheat each other. To minimize the time （T） Will get a screening contract for product quality and it will guarantee that the trade expected surplus is made no change in the asymmetric information with the symmetry information and the buyer will gain all but the seller＇s expected profit is nothing.
出处
《系统工程》
CSCD
北大核心
2007年第7期60-63,共4页
Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(10661007)
中国博士后科学基金资助项目(20060390742)
