摘要
笔者利用博弈论中的支付矩阵模型,分别对国有企业委托代理的三种模式进行分析。笔者认为,三种模式各有其弊端。在现代企业制度下,要完善国有企业委托代理关系,可对企业家采取职位消费激励、收入报酬激励及建立声誉制度等具体措施。
Using the payoff matrix model of the game theory, the author analyses the three principal -agent modes of state -owned enterprises respectively. The author holds that the three modes have their respective drawbacks. In modem enterprise system, in order to perfect the principal -agent relation in state -owned enterprises, it is advisable to adopt the measures of position consumption encouragement, income reward encouragement and prestige mechanism as far as entrepreneurs are concerned.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期103-106,共4页
Economic Survey
关键词
委托代理
国有企业
博弈
principal - agent
state - owned enterprise
game
