摘要
以1999-2005年的上市公司为研究样本,考察了我国上市公司第一大股东股权、治理机制与企业过度投资之间的关系。研究发现:(1)第一大股东持股比例与企业过度投资水平呈倒"U"型关系;相对于非国有控股公司,国家作为控股股东的上市公司存在着明显的过度投资倾向。(2)内部治理中的董事会治理与企业过度投资无显著关系。(3)企业外部治理因素,如上市公司所在地区市场化水平越高,政府对企业的干预程度越小,金融业市场化水平越高,执法水平越高,企业过度投资水平越低;同时产品竞争程度的提高有利于抑制过度投资。
Using panel data from China listed companies through 1999-2005,this paper analyses the relationship between the largest shareholder,governance systems and over-investments. The results show that there is a converse U curve relationship between the largest shareholder and over-investment,with over-investment behavior for state-controlled companies in contrast to non-state-controlled companies; that is no significant relationship between board governance and over-investment; and that external governance systems restrain corporate over-investment behavior.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第4期62-72,共11页
Modern Economic Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助(项目批准号:70672054)
关键词
第一大股东
治理机制
过度投资
Largest shareholder
Corporate governance systems
Over-investmentFinancial Stability or Economic Growth: Threshold Switching Characteristics of
