公司治理及其管理层激励与公司效率——关于中国上市公司数个行业的实证研究被引量：43

Corporate governance,managerial incentive and firm efficiency-An empirical analysis of Chinese listed company in several industries

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摘要构造了随机前沿分析模型,并以2002—2006年度中国电气器材与金属冶炼加工行业上市公司为样本,实证分析了中国这两大类上市公司的效率及其变化趋势,并重点探讨了管理层激励及内外部激励对公司效率的影响.实证分析结果表明,首先,公司管理层持股对公司效率有积极的影响.其次,在外部激励中,资本市场压力和产品市场压力均对公司效率有积极显著的影响.第三,在内部激励中,上市公司控股股东持股比率、控股股东性质以及国有控股股东持股比率等因素均与公司效率之间存在着负相关关系. By employing unbalanced panel data during 2002--2006 in Chinese electricity machinery industry and metallurgical industry, this study measures the listed companies＇ technical efficiency based on stochastic frontier model, then examines the linkage between managerial incentive and firm efficiency by controlling the firm＇ s size and financial leverage, external and internal incentives. Firstly, the evidence shows that the man- agerial incentive reflected by managerial stock can significantly increase firm efficiency. Secondly, the external incentives reflected by product market and capital market pressure can significantly improve firm efficiency at the same time. However, internal incentive variables reflected by the ownership proportion of the first share- holder, the state ownership proportion, and the ownership proportion of the first state shareholder, are nega- tively relate to firm efficiency.

作者何枫陈荣

机构地区北京科技大学经济管理学院清华大学经济管理学院

出处《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第4期142-152,共11页 Journal of Management Sciences in China

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(70502003 70632003)

关键词公司治理管理层激励公司效率随机前沿分析 corporate governance management incentive firm efficiency stochastic frontier analysis

分类号 F406 [经济管理—产业经济]

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