摘要
通过对旧城拆迁博弈群体、博弈方式及博弈结果的分析可知,拆迁制度内容上的种种漏缺导致了拆迁制度在现实中的失效,这是旧城拆迁过程中形成帕累托最优悖论的根源,而权力高度垄断的地方政府所形成的"划桨"与"掌舵"双重身份的合一促使了悖论的发展。在旧城更新拆迁博弈中,地方政府及开发商都得到了可观的利益,并且他们利益的增加不少于被拆迁人利益的损失。基于此,在制度层面上,应加强《城市房屋拆迁法》的立法,修正与完善拆迁补偿制度,建构讨价还价的契约协商机制;在政府管理层面上,建议政府行政权力退出非公益性拆迁,实现政府"划桨"与"掌舵"的分离。
Analysis shows that a Pareto optimality paradox occurs in historic district renovation when the economic benefits of such renovations are inefficiently distributed due to defects in the demolition compensation system. The paradox is fueled by the power monopoly of local governments because they control both the motive and directive forces of such renovations. When historic districts are renovated local governments and developers make considerable profits while the displaced homeowners suffer financial losses from inadequate reparations. New legislation for demolition compensation is needed and should include provisions for the negotiation of compensation payments. Local governments should cease for-profit renovations and the motive and directive power for such renovations should not be held by the same administrative body.
出处
《规划师》
2008年第9期84-88,共5页
Planners
关键词
旧城更新
拆迁
博弈
悖论
Historic district renovation, Demolition, Game, Paradox
