摘要
随着对公司治理研究的不断深入,学术界更加关注大股东控制对公司治理模式的影响。与现有研究不同,在承接前人的研究成果基础上,本文研究了公司治理模式的转变对企业内利益主体利益关系的影响,探讨了大股东控制对中小股东利益的影响,并重点分析了大股东控制对企业债权人价值的影响。研究认为,大股东控制会加大债权人的风险,提高负债融资的代理成本。最后,文章从法律层面分析了对投资者的保护措施。
With the development of study on corporate governance, many scholars pay more attention to the effect of large shareholder control on the mode of corporate governance. On the basis of current research, the effect of the transferring of corporate governance on the relation between the benefit bodies and the effent of large shareholder on minority shareholders and creditors were analyzed. Results show that the control of large shareholder increases the risk of creditors and agency costs Of debt financing. Lastly, the law regulation on large shareholder was also analyzed to provide the protection on minority and creditors.
出处
《兰州商学院学报》
2008年第6期23-28,共6页
Journal of Lanzhou Commercial College
基金
国家自然科学基金"大股东控制下的中国上市公司资本配置行为研究"(70772100)
关键词
大股东控制
利益冲突
法律调整
投资者
large shareholder control
interest conflict
law regulation
investor
