摘要
运用政府非经济目标以及委托—代理关系理论,对国内中央与地方政府的管制效率构建了比较模型,通过分析得出了低级别的政府管制比更高级别的政府管制所引起的效率降低要少,但低级别的政府要承担更多的社会不稳定的直接包袱的结论。
By using the non-economic objectives theory and the principal-agent relationship theory, this paper builds a model for comparing the regulation efficieney of central and local government in China, and through the analysis, gets a conclusion that the reduction of the regulation efficiency of lower grade governments will be less than that of comparing the higher grade governments, however, the lower grade governments will take more direct responsibilities for social instability.
出处
《科技情报开发与经济》
2008年第36期74-75,共2页
Sci-Tech Information Development & Economy
关键词
政府管制
委托-代理
权限划分
government regulationl
principal-agent
authority division
