摘要
本文认为,从产业组织角度来看,食品安全问题是一个企业行为和市场绩效问题。本文区别于从消费者支付意愿和政府规制的角度,而是从食品生产的纵向过程入手,基于投资激励和谈判理论,研究了一体化所有权结构和分散所有权结构下的厂商卫生投资行为。文章认为,由于食品生产环节之间的所有权关系不同,厂商在控制各生产环节的病菌扩散过程中的努力程度也不同,投资激励的不一致性造成食品的安全性存在很大的不确定性,所以纵向一体化更有助于食品安全性的提高。发展多种形式的适度规模经营,对于食品生产企业来说扩大企业经营的空间,可能从根本上解决我国食品生产过程中激励不一致所造成的食品安全问题。
In terms of industrial organization, the problem of food safety is a problem of enterprises＇ behavior and market performance. The food production is a vertical process,and relationship between many firms on the food supply chain is unseparatable-the products quality by the downstream firm is directly influenced by the products quality that upstream firm produced, and which is directly depended on the hygiene control efforts by firms. So the food safety problem is not only a single firm＇s behavior problem, but also an interest problem of lots of firms on the food production chain. This paper shows that the vertical integration of firms in the food production chain can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of hygiene control efforts. The development of suitable operational scale with diversified mode will be helpful for us to solve the problem of food safety which is caused by the imbalanced incentives in during the process of food production.
出处
《中国流通经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第8期36-39,共4页
China Business and Market
关键词
食品安全
纵向生产过程
所有权结构
投资激励问题
food safety
vertical process of production
ownership structure
incentives of investment
