摘要
在路桥建设业,包工头在工程款不到位、无法支付所有工人工资的情况下,工资发放遵循的是一种"逆差序格局"的逻辑,即包工头会先将工资发给与其"关系"较远的边缘工人,再将工资发给与其"关系"较近的核心工人。"逆差序格局"的产生是因为"关系"虽然有可能降低交易双方行为的不确定性,但无法降低环境的不确定性。当环境的不确定性直接影响到"关系"双方的利益时,"关系"中固有的紧张就会加剧,冲突性就会显现。包工头为了降低边缘工人可能带来的新的环境不确定性,宁可选择核心工人可能流失的行为不确定性。不过,包工头的雇佣权力与人情法则的结合导致了一种能约束核心工人行为不确定性的"关系霸权"。"关系"在降低市场风险上的作用对于包工头和核心工人的效用是不平等的,它使包工头最大限度地降低了风险,而核心工人则承担了更大的风险。
In the construction industry,when a project is short of funds to pay off all the workers,the contractors will follow a reverse order,namely,paying off the peripheral workers to whom they are not personally close before paying off the core workers with whom they have close relationships.Such a pattern is due to 'Guanxi's' inability to reduce 'the environmental uncertainty' despite of the possibility for 'Guanxi' to lower the uncertainty in the trading parties.Once the environmental uncertainty directly threatens the interests of the parties in a 'Guanxi,' the inherent tension within the 'Guanxi' will intensify and conflicts will surface.Contractors would rather take the risk of the behavioral uncertainty of losing their core workers in order to minimize the probable threat from the peripheral workers.Nevertheless,when the contractors combine their hiring power with the law of relational favorism,the result is a kind of 'Guanxi hegemony' which can restrict the core workers' behavioral uncertainty.'Guanxi's' function in regulating market risks to unequal levels for the contractors and the core workers,with the former benefited from reduced risks but the latter to shoulder higher risks.
出处
《社会》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第5期1-20,共20页
Chinese Journal of Sociology
基金
上海市教育委员会E-研究院建设计划项目
中山大学211建设项目的资助
关键词
包工头
关系
权力
工资
contractors,'Guanxi,' pay,power
