摘要
以湘江流域为例,将流域利益主体划分为区域之间和流域与区域之间两个层次,通过对这两个层次利益主体行为选择的博弈分析,考察流域污染治理的内在体制要求。分析显示,流域管理的干预是实现区域共同治理流域污染的途径,创新流域污染治理的体制机制,是从根源打破治理不力僵局、发挥长效治理作用的关键。创新湘江流域行政管理体制、探索湘江生态补偿机制等是体制机制创新的政策着力点。
Taking a wide view of the whole process of river basin management, the lack of innovative and effective system is the bottleneck of improving the basin pollution governance. Take Xiangjiang River as an example, this paper divides the interest bodies into two levels： inter -regional, between river and region. Through the game analysis of stakeholders＇behavior choice of the two levels, it surveys the internal system requirements of river pollution control. Our analysis shows that the regional government＇intervention is the way to realize river basin common management. Innovating the system and mechanism of pollution control plays the key role in breaking poor management ＇deadlock basically and playing long - efficient management. The application points lie on innovation of Xiangjiang River＇s basin administrative system and the exploration of Xiangjiang River＇s ecological compensation mechanism and so on.
出处
《湖南大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第5期137-140,共4页
Journal of Hunan University(Social Sciences)
基金
湖南大学两型社会研究院的专题研究成果
关键词
流域治理
博弈
体制机制创新
watershed management
game analysis
system and mechanism innovation
