摘要
参与兼并企业作为子企业存在于兼并所形成的新企业时,新企业的所有者可能对子企业管理者设置与内部所有子企业利润都相关的激励机制,文章即对这种情形建立了两阶段博弈模型考察横向兼并效应问题。结果表明,当少于市场企业数目50%的企业进行兼并时,新企业所有者将确定导致内部竞争的管理者激励机制,社会福利将会增加;此时,兼并活动对参与兼并企业是有利的,对未参与兼并企业是不利的,从而部分地消除了"兼并悖论"。
After a merger, a participating firm may be a division of the merged firm, and the owner may set incentives scheme for one divisional manager related to all insider divisional profits. Based on this situation, we establish a two-stage model to analyze horizontal merger effects. It shows that only if less than 50% firms are included in the merger, merged firm＇s owner will decide intra-competitive managerial incentives scheme, and social welfare will be improved; merger is beneficial to participating firms while harmful to non-participating firms, so we provide at least a partial solution to ＂merger paradox＂.
出处
《上海管理科学》
CSSCI
2010年第1期80-83,共4页
Shanghai Management Science
关键词
横向兼并
管理者激励机制
内部竞争
博弈论
horizontal merger
managerial incentives scheme
intra competition
game theory
