摘要
通过研究政府与回收企业在信息不对称情况下的委托代理关系,设计了政府与回收企业间的非线性激励合同,从而建立了政府与回收企业间的有效激励模型,确定了非对称信息下政府的激励强度和回收企业的均衡回收率,并且通过与对称信息下企业最优回收率的对比,得到了非对称信息下政府为达到最大环境效益需要额外支付的激励成本。
Through studying principal-agent relationship between government and recovery corporate in the context of asymmetric information, an effective model including an nonlinear incentive contract was built between government and the recovery corporate. The model provided an equilibrium solution of recovery coroprate and incentive density of government. By comparing the equilibrium recovery rate in the context of asymmetric information with the optimal one in the context of symmetric information , the extra incentive cost of government was calculated.
出处
《青岛大学学报（自然科学版）》
CAS
2010年第2期67-70,共4页
Journal of Qingdao University(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70871064)
关键词
产品回收
激励机制
回收率
回收成本
recovery
incentive mechanism
recovery rate
recovery cost
