摘要
研究公共价值拍卖市场上不同经验类型竞价者的竞价行为.根据拍卖经验的不同可以把竞价人分成两类:天真者和理性者.通过建立"天真-理性"的竞价模型,分析了天真者与理性者最优出价策略,得到了在价值信号均匀分布情况下,天真者的事前期望支付大于理性者的事前期望支付;并得到了天真者的进化比例.
This paper studies a common value auction in which a naive bidder competes against a rational bidder. According to the ＂naive-rational＂ bidding model, we analyze the bidders＇ optimal bidding. When the signal distribution is uniform, the naive＇s ex ante payoff is higher than the rational＇ ex ante. And finally, we get the evolutionary rate of ＂naive-rational＂.
出处
《数学的实践与认识》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第12期46-52,共7页
Mathematics in Practice and Theory
关键词
公共价值拍卖
天真者
理性者
common value auction
naive bidder
rational bidder
