摘要
在校长与教育主管部门形成的委托—代理关系中,当双方的目标不完全相同或信息不对称时,就会产生委托代理问题。解决委托代理问题需要实施有效的校长激励策略。一方面可以通过"提高校长的合法收入,满足其合理的物质需要"、"落实校长的办学自主权,满足其合理的成就需要"来激发校长的积极行为;另一方面要通过"加强聘任校长的程序法建设,从源头上降低机会主义行为的可能性"、"适当延长校长任期,有效抑制校长短期行为"、"建立落实有效的监督机制,杜绝校长机会主义行为的发生"来约束校长的机会主义行为。
It is between the school headmaster and education department that the pricipal - agent relation is formed. When both parties differ in objectives, problems arise. The solution lies in the incentives for the headmaster by raising his legal incomes and satisfying his material desires, and granting him more autonomous right. Moreover, lawful procedure is to be enacted to minimize the chancism, prolonging the term of headmaster, and setting up supervision.
出处
《河北师范大学学报（教育科学版）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期89-93,共5页
Journal of Hebei Normal University(Educational Science)
关键词
委托—代理理论
校长
激励策略
principal - agent theory
headmaster
incentive strategy
