摘要
提高监管效率是当前我国食品安全监管的核心议题。信息不对称、存在利益冲突的情况下,只有妥善处理好监管者与被监管者之间食品安全目标上的激励冲突,形成他们之间的激励相容机制,才能真正提高食品安全监管效率。文章首先提出了食品安全监管的激励相容理论;然后分析了我国食品安全监管的现状,通过数据和案例分析指明了我国食品安全监管激励不相容情况突出的问题;并运用博弈分析的方法探讨了激励不相容食品安全监管的弊端——当监管政策体制激励不相容、博弈方违规行为收益更大时,无论监管部门如何调节人事结构,加大人力、物力、财力的投入,经济理性的博弈方往往仍会采取违法违规的行为,三聚氰胺奶粉这样的系统性食品安全问题还会不断重演;最后对我国建立激励相容的食品安全监管体系提出政策建议。
Improving regulatory efficiency is the core issue of the current food safety regulatory in China.The compatible-incentive regulatory mechanism is the foundation of food safety regulatory efficiency.In this paper,the author proposes the incentive compatible theory of food safety regulation at first,and then points out that the China＇food safety regulation is an incompatible-incentive regulation based on the analysis of actuality.After that,the paper explores the shortcomings of incompatible-incentive regulatory of food safety by the means of game analysis.In the end of the article,the author tried to put forward some suggestions for establishing the compatible-incentive regulatory of food safety.
出处
《中国农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
CSSCI
2010年第3期168-175,共8页
Journal of China Agricultural University;Social Sciences
关键词
食品安全监管
激励相容
信息不对称
监管效率
Food safety regulation
Incentive compatible
Asymmetric information
Regulatory efficiency
