摘要
一、表征的目的是行动
表征（representation）是以某种事物表示其他事物。一事物究竟是如何与另一事物相关的，这就是表征内容和表征的意向性问题。说明一个内在表征与它所表示的外部对象之间的意向性关系，是当代心灵哲学和认知科学中内容理论的一个重要课题。目前的理论大致有两种立场：
Michael L.Anderson and Gregg Rosenberg put forward the guidance theory of representation recently,which holds that what a representation does is providing guidance for certain actions.This paper points out that based on the frame of evolution-embodied cognition theory,Anderson and Rosenberg take a neo-empirical approach to explain the content of representation replacing the intentionality of representation by the intentionality of action.However,because of some circular arguments it contains by invoking the notions of 'standardly use' and 'assumption of information',this theory neither overcomes the fundamental flaws of the popular theory of representation,nor provides a naturalistic explanation of content of representation independent of intentionality.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第11期68-75,共8页
Philosophical Research
基金
中国人民大学985工程重点项目和中国人民大学基础研究重大项目的资助
