摘要
长期的赶超战略使我国形成了城乡和东西叠加的双重二元结构。本文通过对双二元结构下的政府政策与西部农村金融机构的支农行为进行演化博弈分析,得出如下结论:政府的激励、约束政策以及西部农村金融机构支农的净损失是影响机构支农和政府缩小双重二元结构差距目标实现的决定因素;在实现政府目标的初期,约束政策较激励政策更有效;随着政府目标实现程度的提高,激励政策将发挥更大效用;目前政府实行的单向激励政策作用不大;现阶段政府应该在强化约束政策的同时进一步加大激励政策力度,使西部农村金融机构在积极支农的同时实现可持续发展。
This paper analyzes the government policies and the agriculture-assistance behavior of Western rural financial institutions under double dual structure based on evolutionary game theory.We conclude that government incentive and constraint policies and the net loss of agriculture-assistance for financial institutions are the decisive factors affecting agriculture-assistance and government target to bridge the double dual structure,that constraint policies are more effective than incentive ones during the initial stage of government targets,that incentive policies play more important role in later stages of government targets,and that the current one-way incentive policies are not effective.Thus we propose that at present incentive policies should be enlarged while constraint policies be reinforced.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第1期33-39,125,共7页
Modern Economic Science
基金
国家社科基金<双重二元结构约束下的西部农村金融制度研究>(批准文号:09BJY098)的阶段性研究成果
关键词
双重二元结构
激励约束政策
西部农村金融机构
演化博弈
Double dual structure
Incentive and restraint policies
Western rural financial institutions
Evolutionary game
