摘要
运用期权博弈理论探讨上下游投资者之间在受到协同效应和拥挤效应同时影响的情况下,投资者如何作出进入决策,以及投资者作出进入决策之间的相互影响。研究表明,拥挤效应加速了投资者进入基地,而协同效应则会推迟投资者进入基地,所以投资者需要根据这两种效应的大小来选择进入策略。当拥挤效应的作用占据主导地位时,投资者有动力抢先进入基地;当协同效应的作用占据主导地位,而拥挤效应处于次要地位时,投资者选择等待从而作为跟随者进入基地;当拥挤效应与协同效应的相互作用基本可以抵消时,每一个投资者都没有动力抢先进入,最终形成同时进入均衡。
Based on the theory of Option game,we discussed how does the investor to make entering decision under the influences of congestion effect and synergy effect,and analyze the influence between investors＇ entering decision.It shows that congestion effect accelerates the investors enter the base,while the synergy effect delays the investors enter the base,so the investor have to take both congestion effect and Synergy effect into account to make entering decision.When the congestion effect is in the dominant role,each investor will try to enter the bases first;and when the congestion effect is in the secondary position,while the synergy effect is in the dominant role,every investor will try to be a follower to enter the bases;when the interactive influence of congestion effect and synergy effect can be offset,each investor will not have motion to enter the bases first,thus resulting in simultaneous entering equilibrium.
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第4期43-48,共6页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70973096)
教育部博士点基金项目(20096118110010)
关键词
拥挤效应
协同效应
高新技术产业基地
期权博弈
Congestion Effect
Synergy Effect
High-Tech Industrial Bases
Option Games
