摘要
电子政务服务外包,涉及到委托代理模型的激励机制,为提高激励效率、降低风险成本,考虑加入风险变量。通过引入第三方—监督部门,说明在同等假设条件下,引入监督变量同样是激励合同的影响因素,比加入风险变量更加优化目标,为电子政务服务外包最优激励的设计提供理论参考依据。
For the incentive mechanism of the principal-agent model,scholars considered joining risk variables to improve incentive efficiency and reduce the cost of risk.Through the introduction of a third party-oversight,it is assumed that joining a supervision variable is also an impact factor of the incentive contracts under the same assumptions,which can achieve a more optimized goal than adding risk variables.It can provide theoretical reference for the best incentive design of e-government outsourcing.
出处
《科技与管理》
2011年第4期54-57,共4页
Science-Technology and Management
基金
黑龙江省教育厅人文社科基金项目(11552038)
关键词
电子政务
委托代理
监督激励
e-government
principal-agent
supervision and encouragement
