摘要
论文以毒豆角事件为例,利用博弈理论对政府体系中存在的多方博弈现象进行分析,解释各级政府在食品监管领域中集体失灵现象出现的原因。从豆角的生产流通环节入手,分析基层监管部门、农产品生产者及收购商、农药销售方等多个利益相关者在此过程中的多方博弈和行为选择。在分析的基础上,对食品安全问题的解决提出一些政策建议。
Based on the case of noxious green beans, the game theory was used to analyze the phenomenon of the mutual game existent in the government system, while the causes for the phenomenon of collective failure in the supervision of foodstuff on the part of various authorities were elaborated. Furthermore, starting with the process of producing and circulating cowpea, the game theory was also utilized to analyze stakeholders＇ choices of behaviors in the process. And on the basis of these analyses, this paper proposes some suggestions on food safety in China.
出处
《海南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》
2011年第5期73-77,共5页
Journal of Hainan Normal University(Social Sciences)
关键词
毒豆角事件
问责制
无差异风险
博奕
the incident of noxious beans
the accountability system
undifferentiated risk
contention
