摘要
经营判断规则已逐渐为两大法系众多国家所采纳,这种制度安排的背后隐含着深刻的经济逻辑。对董事等管理层只存在轻微过失的不当行为的责任规则是没有效率的,而经营判断规则的存在则符合人的有限理性,有助于节约交易成本。该规则无论是作为一种推定规则,还是作为法院特定情形下审理案件的依据,都是有效率的;但其不适应用于董事等管理层违反忠实义务及存在重大过失的行为,以减少外部性行为的发生,促进资源的有效利用。
Many countries of the two law families have gradually accepted the business judgment rule. This system arrangement has profound economic principles. By using the methodology of economic analysis of law, the author opened out that liability rule on directors and other high - level governors＇ behaviors with trivial negligence was not efficient, but the business judgment rule was accorded with limited sense theory and propitious to reduce the transaction cost. The rule has efficiency whether regarded it as a presumption rule or the judge＇ s trial criterion, but it shouldn＇t be applicable for the breakings of loyalty obligation and the behaviors with serious negligence in order to lessen externalism misfeasance and promote the effective utilization of social resources.
出处
《法学论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第6期59-64,共6页
Legal Forum
关键词
经营判断规则
法经济学
效率
交易成本
有限理性
business judgment rule
economic analysis of law
efficiency
transaction cost
limited sense
