摘要
研究了在两个竞争的供应商和一个垄断的零售商组成的供应链中,当零售商对供应商的研发效率具有不完全信息时,零售商如何通过设计拍卖机制进行订单分配来促进供应商之间的竞争,从而激励供应商进行创新以降低生产成本,进而使零售商以尽可能低的价格采购。具体分析了一价密封拍卖、订单均分拍卖、二价密封拍卖三种不同的采购拍卖机制下供应商的创新努力情况和零售商的利润,得出结论:三种拍卖机制下供应商的均衡创新努力均随自身研发效率的提高而增加;两个供应商之间创新效率的差异越大,零售商的期望采购价格则越高;相比订单均分拍卖和二价拍卖,一价拍卖对零售商最有利。最后通过算例验证了上述结论。
When the retailer had incomplete information on the suppliers＇ innovation efficiency in a supply chain composed of two competitive suppliers and a monopolistic retailer,the research on how to design the auction mechaism for the retailer to assign the order so as to promote the competition among the suppliers,thus motivate the supplier to make innovation to reduce the cost,and the retailer could purchase in low price was proposed.The suppliers＇ innovation efforts and retailer＇s profit were studied under three kinds of auction mechanisms,first-price sealed auction,halving order auction and second-price sealed auction.Conclusions showed that the suppliers＇ efforts increased as the innovation efficiency improved;the retailer＇s expected price of procurement rose with the increasing discrepancy of the two suppliers＇ innovation efficiencies,and first-price auction was the most profitable for the retailer among the three auction mechanisms.The results were verified by numerical examples.
出处
《计算机集成制造系统》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第11期2475-2482,共8页
Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(09YJC630208)
浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题资助项目(10CGGL21YBQ)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71001023)
上海市科技发展基金软科学研究博士生学位论文资助项目(11692190900)~~
关键词
供应链
创新投入
拍卖机制
订单均分
supply chains
innovation investment
auction mechanism
order halving
