摘要
内部控制的设计和执行都存放于企业的"黑箱"中,内部控制信息披露是高管层向外部利益相关者释放内部控制质量的信号,这一信号是否传递了企业内部控制的真实信息?本研究认为高管层具有披露的"动机选择"倾向,这种"动机选择"决定了内部控制信息披露偏离内部控制质量的偏差。文章分析了高管层决策、内部控制和内部控制披露的逻辑关系,并以此为基础提出了内部控制管制的思路和政策建议。
Internal control to ensure the quality of financial reporting is the reason to regulate the internal control. However, the design and implementation of internal control are stored in the company’s 'black box'. The information disclosure of internal control is the signal that the senior managements report the quality of internal control to external stakeholders. Does this signal pass the real internal control information? This paper suggests that senior managements have the tendency of 'motivated choice', this 'motivated choice' decides that the disclosure of internal control deviates from the quality of internal control. This paper analyzes the logical relationship about the senior management decision-making, internal control and the disclosure of internal control, and proposes the thought and policy of the regulation of internal control.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第11期52-56,93,共5页
Accounting Research
基金
山东省社科规划研究项目(10CJGZ38)
中国博士后科学基金面上项目(2011M500192)的阶段性研究成果
"泰山学者"建设工程专项经费资助
