摘要
为研究影响建筑安全的因素,探讨科学的建筑安全监管策略,在建筑企业与政府安全监管部门具有有限理性的前提下,建立建筑安全监管的演化博弈模型。对稳定状态的分析表明,模型并不总是存在演化稳定策略。在此基础上,建立系统动力学模型,借助数据仿真分析不同变量对建筑安全状况的动态影响。研究结果表明,奖惩力度、监管失误率、监管成本、安全投入、惩罚机制等因素的变化对建筑安全状况产生影响。建筑安全长效监管可从加大对监管部门的奖惩力度、减少监管部门的监管失误率、降低建筑安全监管成本、合理控制安全措施投入、设计合理的建筑企业惩罚机制等方面着手。
In order to study the influence factors of construction safety and put forward scientific supervision policy,an evolutionary game model for safety supervision of construction engineering is established based on the assumption that both the construction enterprise and supervision department have bounded rationality.Analysis on stable state shows that evolutionary stable strategy does not always exist in the model.On the basis of this analysis,a system dynamics model is established and the dynamic influence on construction safety of different variables are analyzed by data simulation.Simulation results illustrate that construction safety is influenced by the degree of punishment and reward,error rate of supervision,supervision cost,safety investment and penalty mechanism.It can be concluded that,for the long-term effective supervision of construction safety,government should enhance the degree of punishment and reward to supervision department,reduce the error rate of supervision,decrease supervision cost,control safety investment and design reasonable penalty mechanism for construction enterprise.
出处
《中国安全科学学报》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2011年第12期73-81,共9页
China Safety Science Journal
基金
国家自然科学基金资助(71103119)
上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(12YS022)
关键词
建筑工程
安全监管
演化博弈
系统动力学
惩罚机制
construction engineering
safety supervision
evolutionary game
system dynamics
penalty mechanism
