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A Penalty Approach for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem 被引量:1

A Penalty Approach for Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem
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摘要 The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which both the utility function and the strategy space of each player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players. This problem has been used to model various problems in applications. However, the convergent solution algorithms are extremely scare in the literature. In this paper, we present an incremental penalty method for the GNEP, and show that a solution of the GNEP can be found by solving a sequence of smooth NEPs. We then apply the semismooth Newton method with Armijo line search to solve latter problems and provide some results of numerical experiments to illustrate the proposed approach. The generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) is a generalization of the standard Nash equilibrium problem (NEP), in which both the utility function and the strategy space of each player depend on the strategies chosen by all other players. This problem has been used to model various problems in applications. However, the convergent solution algorithms are extremely scare in the literature. In this paper, we present an incremental penalty method for the GNEP, and show that a solution of the GNEP can be found by solving a sequence of smooth NEPs. We then apply the semismooth Newton method with Armijo line search to solve latter problems and provide some results of numerical experiments to illustrate the proposed approach.
出处 《Communications in Mathematical Research》 CSCD 2012年第2期181-192,共12页 数学研究通讯(英文版)
关键词 Nash equilibrium problem generalized Nash equilibrium problem log-arithmic barrier function quasi-variational inequality semismooth Newton method Nash equilibrium problem, generalized Nash equilibrium problem, log-arithmic barrier function, quasi-variational inequality, semismooth Newton method
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同被引文献16

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