摘要
近来频发的突发事件显示了地方政府应急管理水平的滞后,但另一方面,大部分地方政府在应急管理能力建设上却存在消极怠工。在应急管理能力建设中,中央政府与地方政府存在委托代理关系。因此,文中引入委托代理模型针对中央政府如何提高地方政府应急管理能力建设的积极性问题展开研究,并根据博弈模型结果从四个方面设计出具体的激励机制。该激励机制的实施将实现地方政府应急管理能力的提高。
Recently frequent emergencies show the lower level of local government emergency management capacity, but on the other hand, most of local governments do not actively take action to building capacity of emergency management . In emergency management ability construction, the central government and local government exists principal-agent relationship. Therefor, this paper studies which ways central government could use to encourage local governments to build capacity of emergency management by introducing principal-agent model, and schemes out concrete incentive mechanism from four aspects according to the game model results .The incentive mechanism will be implemented to improve the ability of local government emergency management.
出处
《物流工程与管理》
2012年第6期75-77,共3页
Logistics Engineering and Management
基金
教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目"基于QFD的非常规突发事件政府应对能力评价研究"(11YJC630245)
关键词
地方政府
应急管理能力
委托代理
激励
local government
emergency management capacity
principal-agent
incentive
