摘要
利用不完全信息动态博弈理论对涉税鉴证进行了研究,得出以下结论:税务机关纳税检查力度、纳税检查质量、违规惩处力度对于提高企业税法遵从程度、改善税务师事务所涉税鉴证质量、瓦解企业与税务师事务所间的串谋以及保证涉税鉴证机制的有效性具有重要意义;税务师事务所涉税鉴证质量对于促进企业如实纳税申报具有积极作用;纳税检查成本是制约税务机关纳税检查的重要变量。
The paper uses the dynamic game theory to study tax-related authentication. Conclusions are as follows： （I） Tax inspection efforts, tax examination quality, and violation punishment of tax authorities play a significant role in improving the degree of compliance with tax laws and tax-related authentication quality of tax agencies, collapsing the conspiracy between examined companies and tax agencies, and insuring the effectiveness of tax-related authentication mechanism. （2） Tax-related authentication quality of tax agencies urges examined companies to tax declaration truthfully. （3） The cost of tax inspection is an important factor influencing the tax inspection quality of tax authorities.
出处
《上海立信会计学院学报》
北大核心
2012年第4期74-82,共9页
Journal of Shanghai Lixin University of Commerce
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71173247)
关键词
涉税鉴证
不完全信息动态博弈
鉴证质量
税务研究
tax-related authentication
dynamic game of incomplete information
authentication quality
tax research
