期刊文献+

城镇基本医疗保险中逆向选择的检验 被引量:89

The Analysis of Adverse Selection in China's Urban Basic Medical Insurance Programs
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摘要 本文利用城镇居民基本医疗保险试点评估调查的数据,实证检验了我国城镇居民和职工基本医疗保险中的逆向选择问题。本文的实证结果证实了逆向选择的存在:在未被城镇职工基本医疗保险覆盖的城镇人群中,健康状况较差的个体更倾向于参加城镇居民基本医疗;城镇居民基本医疗保险的参保者接受门诊和住院服务利用率的概率更高;保险对住院服务利用率的影响大于对门诊的影响。另一方面,我们还发现在已被城镇职工基本医疗保险覆盖的人群中,健康状况较差的职工也更倾向于购买补充商业医保,但是健康状况最差的个体购买补充商业医保的概率最低,而购买商业医保后住院率显著增加。 Utilizing data from Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance Annual Survey, this paper analyzes the adverse selection in China's Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) and Urban Employee Basic Medical Insurance (UEBMI) programs. Our study in- dicates the existence of adverse selection. In general, among those who are not covered by UEBMI, urban residents with worse health status or higher health risk are more likely to en- roll in URBMI than those with better health status or lower health risk. While URBMI par- ticipants will utilize more inpatient as well as outpatient medical services than non-partici- pants, the impact of the insurance program on the utilization of inpatient service is more significant than that of outpatient service. In addition, we find that UEBMI enrollees who have relatively poor health status are more likely, but the enrollees who have the worst health sta- tus are less likely, to purchase supplemental commercial health insurance than those who have good health status. Those insured hy supplemental commercial health insurance use more in- patient services afterwards.
出处 《经济学(季刊)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第4期47-70,共24页 China Economic Quarterly
基金 教育部人文社科项目(11YJC790257) 中央高校基本科研业务费资助
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